Child Care Subsidy Receipt, Employment, and Child Care
I. Introduction and Background
The United States has witnessed a rapid growth in public subsidies for child care in the 1990s. This trend has become even more pronounced since the passage of welfare reform in 1996, which aimed at reducing welfare dependence and increasing employment. In order to reach this goal, the government increased child care funding substantially, and eliminated the fragmentation in the child care system by consolidating the previously existing four main child care funding streams into a single block grant, called the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). In 1999, child care subsidies were estimated to be around $21 billion (Blau 2001) . Today, child care subsidies are considered an integral part of the government efforts to help low income families support themselves by work rather than welfare as well as to support the development of lowincome children.
Because child care subsidies are often argued on the basis of increasing employment, majority of the subsidies are in programs with strong employment requirements.
1 While placing restrictions on the use of subsidies with respect to the employment dimension, the current child care system places a high priority on maximizing parental choice with respect to the quality or the type of care chosen. The vast majority of subsidies are distributed through vouchers that parents can use for any legal child care provider, including relatives, in-home caregivers, family child care homes, or centers (Blau 2003, Adams and Rohacek 2002) . About 90% of children served by CCDF subsidies in 2000 were served through voucher-based funding, which parents could use in any of the setting listed above (Adams and Rohacek 2002) . Child care 1 One exception is Head Start, which is designed to support the development of low-income children specifically. Its goal is to subsidize high-quality care and it has no employment or training requirement.
1 providers must be licensed if state law requires it. If they are exempt from the licensing requirement, they must meet basic health and safety standards. The regulations are determined entirely by states. Although states can impose more stringent requirements, these requirements must continue to accommodate maximum parental choice.
This paper provides evidence on the impact of the actual child care subsidy receipt on the joint employment and child care mode decisions of single mothers in the post-welfare reform period. The child care choices are categorized into four modes:
centers, family day care homes, relatives, and parental care. This is the first paper to examine the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the joint employment and child care mode decisions of single mothers of young children.
The evidence of the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the behavior of mothers of young children is limited, mainly because of lack of data on child care subsidies. There are only four studies examining the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the employment decision of mothers and none of them considers the demand for specific child care modes. Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2002) examine the impact of subsidy receipt on employment of low-income single mothers in California. Gelbach (2002) estimates the effect of the availability of free kindergarten on employment of mothers of five-year old children. Berger and Black (1992) investigate the impact of two Kentucky child care subsidy programs on employment of low-income single mothers. Blau and Tekin (2003) separately estimate the effects of child care subsidy receipt on the employment, welfare, unemployment, and schooling outcomes of single mothers using data from the National Survey of America's Families. All of these studies find a positive effect of subsidy receipt on the employment decision of mothers. There is also a large number of studies 2 examining the impact of child care prices on employment and child care mode decisions of mothers, motivated mainly to infer how child care subsidies would affect behavior.
2 However, the price or fee effect may not be a proper measure of the child care subsidy effect if there are substantial costs to taking up a subsidy, such as the stigma of participating in a means-tested program (Blau 2003) .
Most of the literature on the impact of child care costs on employment and child care choice decisions focuses on married mothers. Another common characteristic of the previous studies is that, with the exception of Blau and Tekin (2003) , they use data from the pre-welfare reform period. However, the results from the pre-reform studies may not be a reliable guide to the current subsidy effects because of the substantial changes put in place to the child care system by welfare reform (Blau 2003) .
II. Data and Methodology
This study uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families includes all children under age 13 whereas the sample used in this paper contains only children under age 6. Thus, the subsidy coverage in the sample is not unreasonable.
Other statistics are also consistent with those usually reported in other studies.
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A cross-classification of the four modes with the binary employment decision results in a multinomial choice model with following four alternatives: (1) mother does not work and therefore does not use non-maternal care, (2) mother works and uses center care, (3) mother works and uses family day care, and (4) mother works and uses relative care. Assume that the utility of the i th mother if she chooses alternative j is given by
where X i is a vector of observed characteristics of the mother i such as age, nonwage income, health status, race, ethnicity, region of residence, number of children in different age groups, education, and immigration status. S i is a binary indicator of subsidy receipt, ε ij is an alternative specific disturbance, and β and α are the parameters to be estimated.
It must be noted that a structural model would normally include the wage rate. However, the determinants of the wage rate are substituted into equation (1) since wage effect is not the focus of this paper. Thus, equation (1) is really a quasi-reduced form model.
According to (1), the mother i will choose alternative j if V ij > V ik for all k ≠ j.
Assuming that the ε's are drawn from independent extreme-value distributions, equation
(1) can be estimated using a multinomial logit model. However, the coefficient estimate on the subsidy receipt is likely to be biased due to endogeneity for several reasons. For example, mothers with strong preferences for work (alternatives 2-4) may be more motivated to seek a child care subsidy. Alternatively, mothers with the least employment qualifications may be given priority for subsidies by administrators. Therefore, the estimation of a binary model of child care subsidy receipt is necessary to account for possible bias that would contaminate the actual impact of subsidies on the behavior of single mothers. A subsidy receipt equation can be specified as follows:
where Z i is a vector of identifying instruments, and υ i is a disturbance with mean zero. Z i includes the percent of eligible children served by child care subsidies in the state, the average amount of CCDF funds spent per child in the state, and a binary variable indicating whether the state uses mass media as a consumer education strategy for the child care subsidies. These variables are assumed to affect whether a single mother receives a child care subsidy or not, but they have no impact on her employment or child care mode decisions.
The estimation of equation (1) with a multinomial logit model may be problematic because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, which imposes the error terms, ε ij 's, to be independent across alternatives. For example, if a mother has unobserved preferences for work, these preferences will appear in all the alternatives (2-4) in which the mother is employed. It is likely, for example, that the decision to work while using center care is closely related to the decision to work while using family day care. With the exception of Blau and Hagy (1998) , all of the previous studies that estimate a multinomial logit model failed to guard against this potential problem, mainly due to computational difficulty. 8 Following Blau and Hagy (1998) , a discrete random effects specification is used in this paper to allow for the possibility of correlation in the disturbances across the discrete alternatives. Furthermore, the subsidy receipt equation is estimated jointly with the multinomial choice equation to allow for the possibility of correlation between ε ij 's and υ i . 9 To implement the discrete random effects specification, the following factor structure is imposed on the disturbances in equations (1) and (2):
where u ij , µ i , and η are mutually independent disturbances, the ρ's are factor loadings that allow for flexibility in the effect of a given factor across equations. This structure places the restriction that all correlation across error terms enters the model through the common factor η that is assumed to have a discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer1984).
Specifically,
and ,
Where θ k is the k th point of support in the distribution of η, p k is the probability that the η takes on the value of θ k , and K is the number of points in the support of the distribution of η. This assumption is much less restrictive than the common practice of specifying a functional form of the distribution of the η's. Under these specifications, the likelihood function contribution for mother i associated with equations (1) and (2) is given by Mroz (1999) finds that this discrete random effects specification is more robust to deviations from normality and quality of instruments than two-stage methods. See Mocan and Tekin (2003) , Picone et al. (2003) , and Hu (1999) for other examples of this method.
Assuming that the u ij 's in equation (3) 
III. Results
The results of the child care subsidy receipt model are presented in Table 2 . Table 5 . As Table 5 illustrates, most of these estimates are statistically significant. 8 more likely to receive a subsidy than others. Higher non-wage income reduces the likelihood of subsidy receipt, but the estimated effect is small. A 1,000 increase in nonwage income would induce about a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of subsidy receipt. The presence of an additional relative in household reduces the likelihood of subsidy receipt by about 2 percentage points.
Each of three identifying instruments is a significant determinant of the first stage outcome, the probability of subsidy receipt. State's use of mass media as a consumer education strategy is associated with a 4.7 percentage increase in the likelihood of subsidy receipt. A one percentage increase in the percent of eligible children served in the state increases the likelihood of child care subsidy receipt by about 0.4 percentage points.
Finally, a 1,000 dollar increase in the annual amount of CCDF funds spent per child increases the likelihood of subsidy receipt by about 1.3 percentage points. The three estimates are statistically significant individually. Furthermore, a specification test rejected that they are jointly zero at less than 0.001 level of significance. In order to support further evidence on the validity of the instruments, they were included in the second stage multinomial choice model. Most of the nine coefficients of these three variables are found to be insignificant and a specification test failed to reject the hypothesis that they are jointly zero.
Results of the multinomial choice model are displayed in Table 3 and the corresponding marginal effects are presented in Table 4 . 12 The effects of explanatory variables are mostly as expected. Nonwage income has a small but negative impact on employment, indicating that leisure is a normal good. Having an additional child under age 5 lowers the probability of work by 10 percentage points. A similar pattern is observed for the impact of older children, although the magnitude is smaller. Education also appears to be an important factor explaining the choices of work and child care.
Better educated single mothers are much more likely to work and use formal child care arrangements like center care and family day care.
As illustrated in Table 4 , child care subsidy receipt increases the probability of choosing alternatives in which the mother is employed (alternatives 2-4) by a total of 15.3 percentage points. This result is consistent with the economic theory because child care subsidy receipt effectively reduces the size of an important work-related expense, child care costs. Based on the marginal effects of subsidy receipt for alternatives (2)- (4), it is also clear that the receipt of subsidies are overwhelmingly used for center care by the employed mothers. Not only non-employed mothers are moving from parental care to employment and center care, a sizeable proportion of employed single mothers are moving from relative care to center care when they receive child care subsidies.
Specifically, subsidy receipt increases the probability of working and using center care by 33.2 percentage points while decreasing the probability of working and using relative care by 16.2 percentage points. The finding that child care subsidies decrease the use of parental care is consistent with other studies (e.g. Michalopoulos and Robins 2000 , Powell 2002 , Hofferth and Wissoker 1992 , and Michalopoulos et al. 1992 . The overall impact on employment and on using family day care is negative but small in magnitude.
These results may suggest that single mothers perceive center care of better quality than either family day care centers or relative care. Alternatively they may be switching to center care in order to release relatives from the child care requirement if relatives divide their time between leisure and child care (Blau and Tekin 2003) . Also, the potentially constrained size of the "relative market" may play a role in the use of such care compared with the potential size of the market for center care (Powell 2002) . In fact, controlling for subsidy receipt, the number of relatives in the household has a significant and positive effect on the probability of choosing relative care.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the significant and sizeable effect of subsidy receipt on employment, results presented in this paper support the view that child care subsidies are instrumental in helping welfare reform reach its goal of increased employed. Results also indicate that the increase in employment will likely to involve a substantial move away from relative care toward center-based care. If one believes that parental or relative care has higher quality than nonparental market care, these findings may seem troublesome. Michalopoulos et al. (1992) argue that subsidies would encourage mothers to work, but they would replace high-quality parental care with potentially low-quality nonparental care. However, there is little evidence about the relative merits for the child of different types of care. 13 Given the current policy of encouraging mothers to enter the workforce, women have little choice but to use non-maternal care. 13 On one hand, a positive parenting style characterized by warm, supportive interaction between parent and child may have favorable effects on child's development (Campbell 1995, Landy and Tam 1996) . Some psychologists argue that appropriate care requires that the mother should provide primary care until the child reaches the age of 3 (White 1975) . However, one cannot be sure that a child receives adequate care without the knowledge about the actual dynamics of the relationship between children and parents in the sample. On the other hand, children, especially those aged 3-5, may benefit from interaction with other children and with an adult trained in early childhood education (Berk 1985) . Also, center care is often argued to be of better quality and more reliable than relative care and parental care since relative and parental care are largely to be custodial (Kimmel 1994 1.425 Note: ρ 1 is set equal to zero for identification. *, **, and *** represent statistical statistically significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
